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Traditional regulatory programs impose uniform requirements
on all of the persons or firms within designated categories subject
to the program. For example, in the context of land use,
communities generally issue zoning regulations that rigidly divide
land into categories such as residential and commercial, and they
impose a set of restrictions on all of the land within each category.
Similarly, many air and water pollution control laws require all
sources within particular categories to comply with identical
schedules that designate limits on discharges or emissions of
specified pollutants.' Because all sources face a rigid ceiling, firms
have no incentive to reduce discharges below the prescribed limits.
The result is a great deal of waste because policymakers ignore
the varying potential for sources to reduce their discharges of
pollution.' Moreover, firms regulated by programs embodying
this approach have little or no economic incentive to reduce their
discharges below the permitted level.
A number of economists have argued for incorporating market
incentive systems with tradeable rights into regulatory programs.s
In such systems, the regulatory body issues a finite number of
use rights (credits or permits) authorizing the holder to use a
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Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1342 (1982).
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pollution abatement problems, see Law and Economics Symposium: New Directions in Environ-
mental Polity, 13 Coi.um. J. Emrvt. L. 153 (1988).
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particular resource or to discharge a particular pollutant. Any
exploitation of the resource or discharge of the pollutant must be
accompanied by a corresponding use right. After the original
distribution of the transferable use rights, each potential resource
user or polluter can evaluate its needs and determine how much
of the resource it will use or how much of the pollutant it will
discharge. Those who want to use or to pollute more must
purchase use rights to do so from others. Those who are willing
to use or discharge less than their use right allotment allows can
sell their excess use rights. Use rights are traded in an open
market, in which firms can obtain the quantity of rights they
determine will allow them to operate in the most cost-efficient
manner. Such a trading program provides flexibility for those who
are regulated and increases the efficiency with which environmen-
tal goals can be attained.
Despite the potential of trading programs to reach environmen-
tal goals while minimizing the costs imposed upon society, they
often meet considerable opposition. Many environmentalists oppose
transferable rights programs because of their concern about the
consequences of putting a value on socially desirable health and
conservation goals. Some oppose credit exchange mechanisms,
which implicitly recognize rights to release pollutants into the
environment, based on a belief that harming the natural environ-
ment is wrong under any circumstances, and that putting a price
on environmental issues cheapens them by making them matters
of private interest and not matters of public-spirited societal
consensus. A less extreme variation on this theme is the view that
polluters should be stigmatized and should not be given permits
or licenses to discharge emissions.'
Some observers are also concerned that the programs are
ineffective and can be abused easily. They fear that market-based
regulatory programs will slow the pace of efforts to solve envi-
ronmental problems by allowing polluters to find loopholes in the
programs. Designing and implementing these programs is techni-
cally complex, and monitoring and enforcement can be particular-
4. See, e.g., Kelman, Economists and the Environmental Muddle, 64 PUB. lUEREsr 106
(1981). In addition, transferable rights programs raise philosophic concerns involving equity
and distributive justice. R. LaoFP, REFORMING Asi POLLUrION REGULATION: TiE TOIL AND TROUBLE
OF EPA's BUBBLE 10 (1986).
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ly difficult obstacles.' Much of this resistance arises from the
difficulty in making these rights or credit exchange programs
work effectively to accomplish specific goals. This Comment
suggests fundamental guidelines for establishing practical and
effective rights exchange programs.'
Part I of this Comment provides a general description of the
background, development, and advantages of transferable develop-
ment rights. Part II sets out essential guidelines for the success-
ful implementation of a rights transfer program. Part III explains
how these guidelines were derived from the experiences with
existing rights transfer programs. It describes two successful
programs, the New Jersey Pinelands plan and the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) policy on allocating limited rights to
produce chlorofluorocarbons. It also describes two relatively
unsuccessful programs, the Los Angeles air pollution bubble and
the water pollution control program at Fox River, Wisconsin. Part
IV applies these guidelines to a proposed program developed to
combat acid rain and suggests the possibility of designing
transferable rights programs in other environmental contexts.
I. Transferable Regulatory Rights
This Part describes regulatory programs that enable the
exchange of rights to use resources and how such programs
function in two contexts. First, it discusses land use control
programs that use transferable development rights (TDRs). Second,
it describes waste reduction credit exchange programs. Both types
of programs enable firms to buy and sell use rights to a resource
use that is constrained by regulation: limited, tradeable rights to
develop land are closely analogous to limited, tradeable rights to
emit pollutants.
5. See R. LiRoFF, supra note 4, at 15. In the land use context, there are concerns about
increasing the density of already densely populated areas. See Richards, Transferable Devel-
opment Rights: Corrective, Catastrophe, or Curiosit?. 12 REAL Est. L.J. 26 (1983). Other sources
of opposition are from people with stakes in the current approach, including policymakers
accustomed to traditional inflexible regulation who resist trying new approaches.
6. Recently, Senators Timothy E. Wirth and John Heinz published a report for
President Bush advocating market-based regulatory systems. This has stimulated renewed
interest in solving certain environmental problems through regulatory programs based on
the exchange of rights. PRojr.cr 88, HARNESSING MAikK.r FoitcEs To Ptarwr Ous ENvIRONMENT:
INrrUvF.s FOI TniE NEw PRnSlmw¢, RxPOT To TilE PRESIovr (1988) [hereinafter Psojwer 88]
(investigating and supporting use of market forces and incentives to achieve environmental
goals).
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A. Transferable Development Rights in Land Use Control Programs
Transferable rights programs have been analyzed extensively
in the land use context.7 TDR programs generally are imple-
mented to channel development away from environmentally
sensitive land areas and toward designated growth areas.' The
programs allocate permits for development efficiently when
communities desire to limit the total amount of development. Land
use programs incorporating TDRs generally designate some land
as preservation areas, where little or no development is allowed,
and other land as growth areas, suitable for high density residen-
tial or commercial development. The local land use regulatory
authority grants TDRs to property owners in the preservation
area, which they can sell or transfer to other tracts. Once property
owners in the preservation area sell their TDRs, they must register
a conservation easement on their property deeds permanently
7. In the 1970s, a series of articles explored and developed TDR programs and
discussed their economic benefits, legality, and political feasibility. See, e.g., Berry & Steiker,
An Economic Analysis of Transfer of Development Rights, 17 NAT. RrEsoultcEs J. 55 (1977);
Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2 FiA. Sr. U.L. REV.
35 (1974); Chavooshian. Norman & Nieswand, Transfer of Development Rights: A New Concept
in Land Use Management, in TJ1sFEI. OF DvEWLOPMF.N'r Riniris 165 U. Rose ed. 1975); Costonis,
The Chicago Plan.- Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HAuv. L. R:v.
574 (1972); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratmy Essay, 83 YAI.F L.J. 75 (1973);
Merriam, Making TDR Work, 56 N.C.L REV. 77 (1978). With notable exceptions, the
academic literature endorsed the concept as being both effective and legally valid. But see
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1975).
The literature promised the achievement of various preservation goals at a low cost:
communities could achieve these goals without purchasing the land to be preserved or
removing it from their tax rolls. In Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978), the Supreme Court concluded that TDR programs could be implemented
without violating the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. In response, approximately
two dozen communities adopted TDR programs. They were mostly ad hoc, and did not
result in many trades. Until 1983, the number of articles about TDRs vastly exceeded the
number of rights traded. Pizor, Making TDR Work. A Study of Program Implementation, 1986
Am. PLAN. AssN. J. 203, 203-204.
Even though the first experiences with TDRs were less than successful, another round
of programs followed. Several articles discuss this second generation of programs. See, e.g.,
Delaney, Kominers & Gordon, TDR Redux: A Second Generation of Practical Legal Concerns, 15
URB. LAw. 593 (1983); Foster, Transferability of Development Rights, 53 U. Coio. L. REv. 165
(1981); Marcus, A Comparative Look at TDR, Subdivision Exactions, and Zoning as Environmental
Preservation Panaceas: The Search for Dr. Jekyll Without Mr. Hyde, 20 UItB. L. ANN. 3 (1980);
Randle, The National Reserve System and Transferable Development Rights: Is the New Jersey
Pinelands Plan an Unconstitutional "Taking"?, 10 B.C. ENyI- Aff. L. Rrv. 183 (1982); Strugar,
Transferable Development Rights: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul, 62 UNIv. DEr. L. REv. 633 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Pen Central 438 U.S. at 104 (upholding New York City's TDR program,
which channelled development from historically or architecturally significant properties to
other properties).
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restricting the development of their land. The only other means
to obtain a high degree of permanence for land conservation
plans-acquiring the land-is much more expensive, and therefore
much less attractive to communities than TDR programs.
Within the designated growth areas, the local government
establishes a two-tier zoning structure: (1) a base zoning density
delineating the maximum density to which a property owner can
ordinarily build, and (2) a higher level of zoning density that
property owners may enjoy if they obtain TDRs. TDRs have
significant economic value if the overall growth pressure in a
region exceeds the number of development rights available. As
land is set aside in preservation areas, land available for develop-
ment becomes more scarce, thereby increasing the land values in
the growth (or TDR receiving) areas. The value of TDRs will
increase concomitantly, because they enable developers to build
at a greater density in growth areas, thereby reducing land costs
per residential or commercial unit.
TDR programs can be a powerful tool to channel the process
of development.9 Owners of land in the preservation zone, whose
land would be of low value because of the development restric-
tions, benefit financially from TDRs. Finally, by introducing market
signals and incentives into the land use regulatory framework,
TDRs enable communities to acheive their resource preservation
goals more efficiently.
B. Waste Reduction Credit Exchanges
Waste reduction credit exchanges in the pollution control
context are analogous to TDR programs in the land use context.
In such programs, the environmental agency establishes cumula-
tive limits on the amounts of each regulated pollutant that may
be emitted in a region. It then allocates permits to emit limited
9. TDR programs can encourage a process of cooperation and agreement between
environmentalists and developers. In communities with undeveloped land on the fringes
of growing metropolitan areas, TDR programs encourage both conservationists and
developers to define their primary resource objectives and to recognize that land preservation
and development goals can be accomplished simultaneously. Conservationists are given the
opportunity to identify critical land resources to be preserved with little or no development.
but they must also be willing to designate growth areas where high density development
may be allowed. Similarly, developers must be prepared to support the designation of
preservation areas in exchange for the delineation of areas where high density development
is allowed.
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amounts of pollution among potential pollution sources. Because
costs for controlling emissions vary among plants, some sources
will install pollution control devices, reduce their emissions, and
sell their excess emissions use rights. Others can purchase these
credits if the cost of implementing pollution control devices
exceeds that of the credits. Because the number of permits
remains limited, economic growth should increase demand for the
permits and, consequently, raise their price. Over time, polluting
becomes more expensive, and polluters have a greater incentive
to reduce their emissions.
Theoretically, the ability to trade emissions credits should
provide sources with flexibility in scheduling compliance with
emissions limit requirements. The sources would then have greater
control over investment options than they would under a program
requiring all sources in a category to meet the same emissions
limits on a fixed reduction schedule.' 0 Sources with low control
costs would choose to control their emissions to a much larger
degree than would sources with relatively expensive clean-up
costs.
II. Essential Institutional Guidelines of Effective Programs
The overall concept of a transferable rights program is simple,
but to make such a program accomplish its objectives, attention
to technical, legal, and institutional details is required. Based on
our experience with several such programs, we can distill eight
basic design guidelines governing the effectiveness of any such
program." The first three guidelines concern the institution
responsible for administering the program. The fourth, fifth, and
sixth relate to the nature of the resource problem that the
program addresses. The final two involve the design and imple-
10. For a comprehensive discussion of the benefits of rights transfer programs to
facilitate attainment of air quality goals and a critique of EPA's approach to date, see
Dudek & Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why Is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENmVn.
L. 217 (1988). See also Hahn, Economic Presciption for Environmental Problems: How the Patient
Followed the Doctor's Order, 3 J. EcoN. PEYSP. 95 (1989) (survey of literature on implementation
of marketable permits and emissions trading programs) and sources cited therein.
11. For other attempts to generate principles to make programs succeed, see Merriam,
supra note 7. at 131-33; Torres. Helping Farmers and Saving Farmland. 37 OKLA. L. REv. 31,
47-52 (1984). The analytical framework set out in this section has been derived from the
authors' experience with the implementation of transferable rights programs. The authors
have litigated issues concerning several such programs, including those described in this
Comment, and have been involved in developing their regulatory structures.
Vol. 6: 369, 1989
Transferable Rights Programs
mentation of the program. These design guidelines are necessary
for the rights or credits to have value and to be freely transfer-
able, for the program to be effectively enforceable, and for the
designated resources to be preserved at a minimum social cost.
First, the administering agency must have clear legal authority to
generate the transferable rights and to implement and enforce the
program. Explicit authority helps minimize the reluctance of
governmental agencies that have the option of implementing a
rights transfer program. If a program's legal basis is ambiguous,
opponents can delay or impede its implementation by raising
challenges in the courts. While express legal authority may not be
absolutely necessary, its absence is likely both to make any
regulatory agency more hesitant about implementing a trading
program, and to make regulated entities reluctant to participate.
Second, the agency responsible for the program must have the
technical capability to design and implement it. The staff of the
agency must be able to deal effectively with the planning,
economic, scientific, and legal intricacies of the program. This
includes the capacity to establish baseline conditions, to certify
the proper issuance and use of rights, and to monitor transactions
in rights. The agency also must be able to ensure that the use of
pollution restrictions are enforced, by monitoring compliance with
the limits and imposing penalties for noncompliance.
Third, the program must be evasion proof. A single body should
have exclusive control over all use of the resource in the region,
and use of the transferable rights should be the only way to
exceed the resource use limits that otherwise apply. For example,
in the land use area, acquisition of TDRs should be the only
means of increasing density in the growth areas. If a property
owner were able to increase density by applying for a zoning
variance or waiver, or by appealing to a different agency with
concurrent jurisdiction, the TDR program's preservation goals
would be frustrated. Similarly, if sources can use loopholes or
waivers to discharge more pollutants and thereby avoid having to
acquire rights, there will be no need for a market in rights and
no incentive for sources to reduce their emissions to obtain
saleable rights.
Fourth, the program should have clearly specified objectives. A
strong scientific footing for the resource objectives and clear
identification of regional goals is necessary to convince affected
companies and communities that the designated resources are
Yale Journal on Regulation
worth protecting. This, in turn, assures political support for the
program.
Fifth, rights exchange programs work best when applied to
resource or pollution problems with regional significance. For
example, rights exchange programs can address pollution problems
caused by the cumulative mixing of pollutants from numerous
sources in a region, but they cannot address problems caused by
specific sources with localized impact.'2 Insofar as smog in urban
air or depressed dissolved oxygen in waters is caused by regional
mixing of pollutants, the cumulative reduction in regional loadings
of a pollutant is more important than the reduction of releases
by individual sources.
Sixth, the resource problem must be defined so that the
tradeable rights have economic value and that incentives to buy and
sell them exist. They will have value when the demand for the
rights to develop or to pollute significantly exceeds the supply
of rights that society chooses to permit. In the land use context,
TDRs work well when there is pressure for development and the
program sets aside a growth area large enough to receive more
TDRs than are generated. To have a successful rights transfer
program for pollution reduction, there should be sufficient
variation among regulated firms to produce a large pool of buyers
and sellers of rights.
Seventh, the program should provide an equitable and administra-
tively simple method for allocating the tradeable rights. In the land
use context, rights can be allocated to owners of land in the
preservation zone based either on a simple formula of a number
of rights per acre, or on a more complex method that accounts
for variations in land values based on the type of land or its
location. There may be a trade-off between fairness and adminis-
trative simplicity. Similarly, the government can allocate the rights
to discharge pollutants either by distributing them on a cost-free
basis or by selling them at auction or for a fee. An auction is
more complex administratively, but could provide better economic
12. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 15-16. Administrative restrictions on trading within
a nonattainment metropolitan area may be necessary to prevent local pollutant concen-
trations, or "hot spots." If attractive sites for new sources often correlate with local hot spots,
stiict restrictions on trades must be imposed. If there must be severe geographic restric-
tions on credit sending and receiving areas, a relatively open market cannot be used to
distribute the use rights and the particular pollution problem is not amenable to this
regulatory approach. The same problem arises with toxic wastes, for due to the localized
danger of the waste, regulatory agencies have great interest in overseeing the location of
toxic waste producers.
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incentives for firms to pursue environmentally preferable alterna-
tives.' s
Eighth, to ensure that the rights have economic value, buying
and selling the use rights must entail only minimal transaction costs.
The greater the administrative or public hassle confronting a
prospective buyer or seller of rights, the less economic value the
rights have and the less effective the program will be. Restrictions
on the use of rights by buyers or uncertainty about the ability of
sellers to sell rights inhibit participation in a rights transfer
program. Conversely, the administrative agency could reduce
transaction costs if it has the authority to establish an initial
market in rights, to help buyers and sellers of rights identify one
another, and to help broker transactions. Programs can be
especially effective by providing for "credit banks" to serve these
functions and to serve as the rights buyer and seller of last resort.
These guidelines provide a basis for designing rights transfer
programs that will produce active markets for the rights, receive
political support, and most important, achieve their environmen-
tal goals. With careful planning and monitoring, and an amenable
environmental issue, the design guidelines can be used to
implement successful programs. Given the generality of the
guidelines, this regulatory approach can be applied in a number
of different contexts.
III. Experience with Existing Programs
The utility of the institutional guidelines described in Part II
can be demonstrated by assessing the experience with several
existing programs. This Part discusses two regulatory programs
that use rights transfer mechanisms successfully: the land use TDR
program in the New Jersey Pinelands, and EPA's policy on
allocating limited rights to produce the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
that threaten the stratospheric ozone layer. This Part also discusses
two less successful rights transfer programs: the Los Angeles air
pollution bubble program, and the water pollution control
program at Fox River, Wisconsin. This Part shows how the success
of these transferable use rights programs depends on the extent
to which they have complied with the general design guidelines.
13. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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A. Successful Transferable Rights Programs
Both of the successful programs substantially incorporated all
of the necessary institutional principles, and thus have achieved
their environmental objectives efficiently. These programs demon-
strate the broad potential for applying the eight guidelines.
1. Land Use Rights: The New Jersey Pinelands
The most ambitious, innovative, and geographically extensive
TDR program in the country is that in the New Jersey Pine-
lands." The New Jersey Pinelands Commission administers the
Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan."5 This Plan designates
several land use categories with specified development densities, 6
limits development in certain areas (such as those designated for
Preservation,"7 Forest," and Agricultural"), and channels develop-
ment to other areas (such as those designated Regional Growth"0
and Pineland Villages and Towns"). The Pinelands Commission
issues TDRs, called Pineland Development Credits (PDCs), to
owners of land in the preservation and agricultural production
areas, who must deed-restrict their land through conservation
easements to the Pinelands Commission to prohibit any future
development. 2 Developers can purchase the credits and use them
to increase the permitted density of their developments in growth
areas.
14. The New Jersey Pinelands, located in southeastern New Jersey, contains
approximately one million acres of forests, wetlands, creeks, and rivers and is the largest
pinelands in the world. Congress established it as a National Reserve pursuant to the
National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978 §§ 502 (a),(c), 16 U.S.C. § 471i (1982). Both
the federal statute, 16 U.S.C. § 471i(a)(1) (1982), and the State Pinelands Protection Act,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:18A-2 (West Supp. 1988), state that the New Jersey Pinelands is a
regionally and nationally significant ecosystem of unusual forest communities, wetlands, and
endangered species habitats. A reservoir of high quality groundwater, which is very low in
nutrients and somewhat acidic, lays beneath it and is estimated to contain 17 trillion gallons.
Because of this unusual ecology, both the federal and state Acts recognized that residential
or commercial development should be restricted or precluded throughout significant forested
portions of the Pinelands.
15. The Pinelands Commission consists of 15 members, appointed by the Governor
and confirmed by the legislature. N.J. ADMIM. CoDZ, tit. 7, §§ 7:50-1.1 to -8.1 (1988).
16. Id. §§ 7.50-5.21 to -5.32.
17. Id. § 7.505.22.
18. Id. § 7.50-5.23.
19. Id. §§ 7.50-5.24 to -5.25.
20. Id. § 7.50-5.28.
21. Id. § 7.50-5.27.
22. Id. §§ 7.50-5.41 to -5.47.
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The Pinelands TDR plan was well designed, and consequently
it is a successful program. First, federal and state enabling statutes
provided explicit authority for the TDR program."3 Therefore,
the program survived court challenges.24 Furthermore, although
zoning authority is not vested exclusively in the Pinelands
Commission, the seven counties and fifty-two municipalities in the
Pinelands area are required by law to modify their master plans
and zoning ordinances to comply with the Pinelands Plan. 5 If they
fail to do so, the Pinelands Commission may assume responsibility
for all of a community's land use decisions.26 The Commission also
has the authority to review all of the development approvals that
the communities grant. It is therefore difficult to circumvent the
Pinelands Commission's power to implement the TDR program.27
Second, the Pinelands Commission has staff with technical,
economic, and legal expertise. The Commission has been able to
predict the value of the rights, defend the program in court,
monitor trades, support the establishment of a state PDC bank,
and assess any weaknesses in the program.28 It also has recog-
nized the utility of a credit bank.
23. 16 U.S.C. § 471i (1982); N.J. Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-
I to -49 (West Supp. 1988).
24. See Hovsons, Inc. v. Secretary of Interior, 519 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.J. 1981), afl'd,
711 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1983) (Pinelands TDR violates neither takings clause nor National
Environmental Policy Act's environmental impact statement requirement, 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (1982)); Matlack v. Burlington County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 191 N.J.
Super. 236, 466 A.2d 83 (Law Div. 1982), affid per curiam, 194 N.J. Super. 359, 476 A.2d
1262 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 99 N.J. 191, 491 A.2d 693 (1984) (upholding Burlington
County's PDC exchange program). Cf. Centex Homes v. East Windsor, 101 N.J. 209, 501
A.2d 893 (1985) (mem.) (dismissing as moot an unpublished appellate division decision
holding that municipality outside of Pinelands lacked implicit authority to implement TDR
program under New Jersey Municipal Land Use Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to -112
(West Supp. 1988)).
25. See N.J. Pinelands Protection Act. N.J. STAr. ANN. § 13:18A-12 (West Supp. 1988);
N.J ADM[N. CODE §§ 7:50-3.30 to -3.45 (1988) (certification of municipal plans); N.J. ADmiN.
CoDE §§ 7:50-3.11 to -3.20 (1988) (certification of county plans).
26. N.J. S'rA'r. ANN. 13:18A-12(c) (West Supp. 1988).
27. However, if a local community is strongly opposed to a particular development,
it is difficult for a developer to overcome such opposition and to take advantage of the
density bonus conferred by the purchase of PDCs, notwithstanding the developer's legal
entitlement to use the credits.
28. The Commission could undoubtedly strengthen its PDC program by having at
least two professionals on staff working primarily on its implementation. Telephone interview
with Frederick W. McCamic, Resource Planner, N.J. Pinelands Commission (Apr. 28, 1989)
[hereinafter McCamic interview]. The Pinelands Commission has undertaken periodic reviews
of the PDC program to identify deficiencies and to make recommendations for improvement.
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Third, the program is largely evasion proof. The Pinelands
Commission has land use control over both the TDR donor and
receiving areas. Although it has granted some waivers, the
Commission has not authorized zoning changes or waivers from
base zoning density in the growth areas. The exchange mechanism
is the predominant means for developers to increase their
density."9
Fourth, the resource protection objectives are clearly specified.
Federal and state legislation recognize the uniqueness of the
Pinelands as a resource to be protected. The Pinelands Commis-
sion has supported this assessment by developing a strong
scientific case for protecting large tracts of the Pinelands in the
preservation area, and it has defined clearly the levels of protec-
tion of various classes of land resources and the conditions for
development.
Fifth, the resources protected are regional in nature. The
wetlands, pitch pine forests, streams, and groundwater resources
of those parts of the Pinelands that the Commission's Plan seeks
to preserve have widely recognized regional values. Maintaining
large contiguous tracts of undeveloped forested areas is critical to
sustaining this ecological integrity. Conversely, it has been possible
to designate areas around existing population centers suitable for
regional clustering of development.
Sixth, the economic value of PDCs is assured because develop-
ers are legally entitled to apply acquired credits toward increased
density of development in growth areas. Each credit entitles a
developer to four additional units per acre above the base level."0
There are no restrictions on the sale of credits by landowners in
the preservation or agricultural areas; they may sell the credits to
anyone, including speculators or landowners in growth areas.
There is growing pressure for development in the Pinelands,
which are adjacent to the Atlantic City, Philadelphia, and New
York/Northern New Jersey metropolitan areas, and a sufficiently
large area of land on which credits can be used to increase the
29. Some townships, such as Barnaget, allow developers to build to a higher level
of density for senior citizen communities or similar types of housing. The Commission has
approved this zoning bonus, which represents a loophole in the bonus density program.
McCamic interview, supra note 28.
30. N.J. ADmIn. CoDE § 7:50-5.45 (1988). Economists retained by the Pinelands Commis-
sion estimated that a credit would be worth $12,000 to $30,000, based on a survey of real
estate prices in selected Regional Growth Areas. G. CHRISTAN, J. Nicioi.s & J. TOWLES,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PINELANDS COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN 81-89 (Nov. 20, 1980)
(on file with authors).
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level of growth. Accordingly, the demand for credits should be
significant in comparison to the supply of credits."'
Seventh, the transferable rights are allocated fairly, through a
relatively simple mechanism. Owners of land in the preservation
areas may deed-restrict their land, and in exchange, receive
tradeable PDCs according to a formula that recognizes three land
value categories. Two credits may be issued for every thirty-nine
acres of farmland in the Agricultural Production and Preservation
Areas, one for every thirty-nine acres of nonfarmland uplands in
the Preservation Area, and two-tenths of a credit for every thirty-
nine acres of wetlands within that Area." Although it would be
possible to devise a simpler formula that recognized only one land
type and value category, the three-part system is more appropriate
here because it considers the variation in value and development
pressure among the different types of land in the preservation
area.
Eighth, the program has minimized transaction costs. Although
the Pinelands Commission originally did not have authority to
establish or broker a market in PDCs, Burlington County, the
largest county in the Pinelands area, undertook that function. In
late 1981, Burlington County stimulated a market for credits by
establishing a Conservation Easement and Pineland Development
Credit Exchange with authority to acquire credits from landown-
ers."3 In 1986, the New Jersey legislature established a Pinelands
Development Credit Bank, which facilitates transactions in credits
and enables farmers to secure loans based on their credits."
Although the tardiness in getting the PDC Bank off the ground
slowed PDC transactions, the number of PDC transactions would
increase substantially if the Bank were to expand its brokerage
role so that large developers could make use of the availability
31. As development outside of the Pinelands exhausts readily available land for
development, the demand for land in Pinelands Regional Growth Areas appears to be
increasing. This, in turn, favorably affects the economics of the PDC program. See Letter
from Frederick W. McCamic, N.J. Pinelands Commission, to James T.B. Tripp (Apr. 27,
1989) (on file with authors).
32. N.J. AnriN. CODE § 7:50-5.43(b) (1988). A landowner in the Preservation or
Agricultural Production Area may determine eligibility for credits by requesting a Letter of
Interpretation from the Pinelands Commission. N.J. ADmiN CODE §§ 7:50-4.71 to -4.79 (1988).
33. This program was upheld in Matlack v. Burlington County Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 191 N.J. Super. 236, 466 A.2d 83 (Law Div. 1982), affid per curaimn, 194 N.J.
Super. 359, 476 A.2d 1262 (App. Div.). certif. denied, 99 N.J. 191, 491 A.2d 693 (1984).
34. Pinelands Development Credit Bank Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-30 to -49
(West Supp. 1988).
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of sufficient numbers of PDCs.35 Thus, the New Jersey Pinelands
program has been successful and is growing more so.36
2. Chemical Production Rights: Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
CFCs, a family of chemical compounds used in refrigeration,
air conditioning, plastics, and electrical solvents, have been linked
to the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer.3 7 Statutes, 8
35. As of the end of April 1989, the Pinelands Commission has issued 164 Letters
of Interpretation allocating 545.33 PDCs. Of these, 97.25 have been severed from land
that is now protected by easement, and 46.75 have been purchased by developers. Of the
developments using PDCs, 10 projects have been built using 16 credits; 11 have been
approved using 86.75 credits; and 29 projects are actively pursuing approvals, using 70.5
credits. See Letter from Frederick W. McCamic, supra note 31.
The Pinelands Development Credit Bank could play a key role in identifying potential
sellers of large number of credits for large developers who may have difficulty in doing so.
The Bank is empowered to buy credits under N.J. S'rAT. An. §§ 13:18A-34(g) (West Supp.
1988).
36. Another successful program is that of Montgomery County, Maryland, which
preserves 89.000 acres of agricultural land (covering one-third of that county), gives farmers
an economic incentive to continue in farming, and channels growth elsewhere in the county.
To date, acquisition of TDRs has resulted in the preservation of almost 27,000 acres of
farmland through recording of conservation easements. Telephone interview with Melissa
Banach, Chief of Community Planning, North Division, Maryland-National Capital Park &
Planning Commission (Feb. 8, 1989).
The Montgomery County program embodies the same design guidelines that made the
New Jersey Pinelands program successful. Although a legal challenge was successful, Western
Montgomery County Citizens Ass'n v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n,
309 Md. 183, 522 A.2d 1328 (1987) (critical elements of program appeared only in master
plan and were not formally adopted in zoning ordinance), the County readily remedied the
legal deficiencies noted by the court. The County has a highly qualified staff that pays
particular attention to implementation of the program. The County controls overall
development, and it has justified retention of large contiguous tracts of farmland, a land
resource of recognized regional value. Its allocation formula is simple: one right per five
acres. A developer can readily take advantage of TDRs through the County's subdivision
process, and the TDRs have recognized value. See generally Banach, Agricuhural Preservation
Program Montgomey County, Maiyland, in ENviRoNmEMNrAL DEFENSE FUND, LONG ISLAND PINE
BARRENS LAST STAND: PACTIC.AL SOLUTIONS ro PROTECr A RGIONAL RESOuRCE 17 (Jan. 1987);
Canavan, The Montgomey County, Maryland Agricultural Preservation TDR Program, in ENviRoN-
MENTAL DEFENsE FUND, supra, at 22.
37. See I U.S. EPA & UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONME,(r PROGRAMME, EffkCrs OF CHANGES IN
S'rRATOSPIERIC OZONE AND GLOBAL CLIMA'T, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HEAiLTH AND
ENVIRONMRNTAL EffEwIS OF OZONE MODIfiCATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE; OVERVIEW (J. Titus ed.
Aug. 1986).
38. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7457(b) (1982), required
EPA to protect stratospheric ozone: "the Administrator [of EPA] shall propose regulations
for the control of any substance, practice, process, or activity (or any combination thereof)
which in his judgment may reasonably be anticipated to affect the stratosphere, especially
ozone in the stratosphere. .. ."
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regulations,39 and international treaties40 require phased reductions
in CFC production and use. In order to achieve a fifty percent
reduction of CFC use in the United States by the end of the
1990s, EPA has promulgated regulations that limit the total
amount of CFCs that may be produced.4 1 These regulations
allocate production permits among producers which may be
purchased and sold among producers; the system is thus compara-
ble to TDR and waste reduction credit exchange programs in that
all use a market mechanism to allocate limited rights to use a
resource that is limited by regulation for environmental protection.
EPA's system for limiting and allocating CFC production is
likely to be successful, because it was designed in accordance with
all the necessary institutional criteria. First, EPA has clear legal
authority to implement the program and has exclusive jurisdiction
to do so.41 Second, EPA has the institutional capacity to implement
such a credit exchange program and to monitor its functioning,
particularly given its institutional experience with implementing
air pollution bubble systems. Third, the program is evasion proof:
there is no way a CFC producer can produce more CFCs without
the necessary permits. Fourth, the resource objectives are
substantiated 4  and clearly specified: the current goal is a fifty
percent reduction of nationwide CFC production over the next
decade.4 Fifth, the goals of the program are global and involve
no particular localized impacts. The permits will also have
economic value, because the restricted supply of CFCs is certain
to increase market clearing prices, and the permits can be bought
and sold freely.
39. EPA and Food & Drug Administration Fully Halogenated Chlorofluoroalkanes,
40 C.F.R. § 762.1 (1989) (banning use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans).
40. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Final Act, Mar. 22,
1985. 26 I.L.M. 1520 (1987); Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Final Act, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987). For a critique of the Montreal Protocol,
see Tripp, The UNEP Montreal ProtocoL Industrialized and Developing Countries Sharing
Responsibility for Protecting the Stratospheric Ozone Layer, 20 N.Y.U. J. Ir'l. L. 733 (1988).
41. EPA Protection of Stratospheric Ozone (Final Rule), 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566 (1988)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 82) (capping CFC production through marketable permit
system) [hereinafter EPA Final Rule]; EPA Protection of Stratospheric Ozone (Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), 53 Fed. Reg. 30,604 (1988) (proposing system for allocating
permits among producers) [hereinafter EPA ANPR].
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1982); EPA Final Rule, supra note 41.
43. See U.S. EPA & UNrrw NATIONS ENviRoNo AEN IROGWMME, supra note 37; Whitney.
Industrial Countries to Aid Poorer Nations on Ozone, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, at 6, col. 1.
44. EPA Final Rule, supra note 41, at 30,566.
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The method for allocating the CFC permits is, quite simple
under the original set of regulations. Permits are to be issued
free of charge to the five domestic producers in proportion to
their 1986 production levels." However, because of the future
excess of demand for CFCs over the permitted supply, free
allocation of the permits gives the permit holders substantial
economic rents and may reduce those producers' incentives to
develop and market cheap substitutes for CFCs."
Therefore, EPA has proposed charging the chemical producers
for the permits under one of two alternative allocation methods:
auctioning the rights or imposing a set fee on them. 7 Either
approach would increase the producers' incentives to develop
substitute processes and products (unless in a fee system, if EPA
were to set the fees at too low an amount). Finally, an auction
system is more likely to valuate the permits at a price reflecting
market preferences and to capture that market value for the
government.48 An auction may also minimize transaction costs and
eliminate the need for producers to trade permits later by acting
as a clearing house through the process of bidding for permits.
B. Less Successful Rights Transfer Programs
The two less successful programs discussed here, the Los
Angeles air pollution bubble and the Fox River water pollution
discharge allocation system, suffered because they did not incorpo-
rate the requisite institutional guidelines. Thus, they also provide
evidence that supports incorporating the features needed to make
rights transfer programs effective.
45. EPA Final Rule, supra note 41, at 30,576.
46. A consultant for EPA estimated that the proposed allocated quota system would
produce $1.8 billion to $7.2 billion in windfall profits for producers. EPA ANPR, supra
note 41, at 30,606.
47. EPA ANPR, supra note 41, at 30,605 (combining a regulatory fee with allocated
quotas), 30,610 (auction).
48. See ENVIRONMNT.rAL D nF..NsE. FuNo,'. CILLOROVIUOROCARBON POLICY: CHOICFS AND
CoNss.QuF.NcF.s (April 1987) (written by Daniel J. Dudek).
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1. Air Pollution Rights: Emissions Trading in California
EPA's bubble policy, particularly in nonattainment areas, has
been controversial and problematic." The most notable applica-
tion of this policy in an urban nonattainment area is in Los
Angeles, administered by the South Coast Air Quality Manage-
ment District (SCAQMD). This region has not achieved its stated
air quality goals.5" The Los Angeles program identified its air
quality goals, formulated clear exchange and allocation rules, and
established the boundaries of a regional trading area. Pursuant to
this program, polluters have made numerous offset trades.5t
However, despite the program's generally careful design and the
active cooperation of some of the regulated entities, the program
has not worked effectively.5"
In particular, the program is not evasion proof. SCAQMD has
authorized new loadings of pollutants from large numbers of new
stationary sources without requiring them to obtain emissions
reduction credits." These loadings vastly exceed those from
sources which were required to participate in the capped rights
trading program. Because SCAQMD allowed new sources to
operate without participating in the program, it effectively
expanded the allowable amount of total regional loadings. As a
consequence, the rights exchange system has been severely
undermined, and the air quality goals of the program have not
been met.
In the California system, the emissions credits lack the certainty
necessary for them to have economic value because SCAQMD
and other local air pollution control agencies must review and
49. For a general description of EPA's emissions trading program. see EPA Emission
Trading Policy Statement (Final Policy Statement), 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814-30 (1986). See also
Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984) (upholding EPA
regulations permitting states to adopt a plantwide definition of "stationary source", thus
treating industrial grouping as though encased in single bubble); R. LiaoiT, supra note 4;
Hahn, supra note 10, at 98-101; Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis
of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALF. J. ON REG. 109 (1989).
50. See Roberts, Some Problems of Implementing Marketable Pollution Rights Schems: The
Case oft(he Clear Air Act, in RE.FORM OF ENVIRONMtNTAL REOULATION 93, 97 (W. Magat ed. 1982).
51. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 49, at 120-23.
52. For a detailed critique of emissions trading in California, see CAL. AmR RsouRms
BOARD, DRAFr REPORT 10o THE L.GISLA'rURE ON IMPEDIMNTS, IMPROVEMEN S, AND AI.TERNATIVFs 10
EussIoN CREZT SVSTEMS (Sept. 1988).
53. Between 1976 and 1986, SCAQMD allowed 3,959 sources to release an additional
200,000 pounds per day of hydrocarbon emissions because they were below regulatory
trigger levels. Offsets in the same period were only 27,000 pounds per day. Id. at 12.
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certify emissions credit trades." Although this enables them to
supervise the location of new sources of particular pollutants, such
review builds in a rigidity that conflicts with the goal of easily
traded rights in an open market. This inefficiency in trading
rights has significantly lowered the value of the credits and the
utility of the system.
Finally, trades are hindered by the difficulties of establishing
a viable market for the credits." In California, only thirteen of the
forty-one air quality management districts have established
emissions banks. 6 Correction of these deficiencies would greatly
enhance the viability of the program.
2. Water Pollution Rights: Fox River, Wisconsin
Under the Clean Water Act, state or regional water pollution
control agencies must prepare water quality management plans for
entire water basins. 7 Specific technological controls on point
sources of biological-oxygen-demand wastes (BOD) and other
organic materials may not be stringent enough to assure compli-
ance with the relevant water quality standards. In that case, the
pollution control agency must prepare a total waste level alloca-
tion (TWLA) which may impose more stringent limits on what
individual sources may discharge."
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources has adopted
regulations controlling BOD discharges into the Fox River which
include a limited program for cooperative modification of
administratively determined waste discharge limits."" A point source
of pollution discharges, such as a paper plant, may negotiate with
54. Some monitoring and review may, however, be necessary because the market for
emissions credits is not a perfect market. Both buyers and sellers have an incentive to
overstate emissions reductions; transaction and information costs are high, because deter-
mining the content and amount of emissions is costly and emissions levels may vary over
time. See Roberts, supra note 50. at 94, 102, 106.
55. For a detailed analysis of the obstacles involved, see Hahn & Nol, Designing a
Market for Tradable Emissions Permits, in REFoRm ov EN'vIaoNmNTrAL REGULATnON, sura note 50,
at 119; see also Hahn & Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution Permits: Problems
of Regulatory Interactions, I YM.E J. ON RFG. 63 (1983).
56. CAL. Aia REsouacrs BoAav, supra note 52, at 8.
57. Clean Water Act § 303(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (1982).
58. Clean Water Act § 303(e)(3)(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e)(3)(c) (1982). Although the waste
load allocations (WLAs) should be prepared for any pollutant that contributes to a
contravention of state water quality standards, typically they have been adopted to control
BOD loadings in a basin, which in turn affect dissolved oxygen levels.
59. Wis. ADMIN. CoDE §§ NR 212.11, 212.115, 212.40 (May 1986). See Hahn, supra
note 10, at 97-98, 103.
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another such plant, agree that one source will buy all or part of
the other's discharge allocation, and propose to the agency that
their waste load allocations be modified accordingly. The program
is thus similar to the bubble concept in the air pollution context
and to other programs with transferable rights to pollute or use
resources.
The Fox River program has not been successful, however.
Although the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources is a
technically competent agency, its resource objectives were clearly
specified, and the method of allocating rights was fairly simple,
the other institutional criteria for a successful rights exchange
program have not been met.
First, the program was implemented without explicit legal
authority to use such innovative trading mechanisms in water
pollution abatement programs subject to the federal Clean Water
Act. Although the Act delegates implementation authority to the
states, 0 it also requires a national policy' of uniformity in effluent
limitations,61 with which the Fox River program does not strictly
conform. Wisconsin's transfer program is therefore vulnerable to
legal challenge or to an EPA veto because applicable EPA regula-
tions do not expressly mention the possibility of trading any
fraction of the effluent limit permits under a basin-wide discharge
reduction program.2
Furthermore, the rights to pollute are not freely tradeable
under the Fox River program, which impairs the value of the
rights. All transactions in rights must be approved through an
administrative review that can be complex because of the nature
60. Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1982).
61. Clean Water Act §§ 304, 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1316 (1982). This approach
was adopted to prevent any shift in regional comparative advantage due to water quality
treatment requirements, to facilitate determination of these limits by classes of industries,
and to produce an equitable treatment of firms within industries. However, the uniformity
principle is not entirely sacrosanct: the Clean Water Act § 302 also requires firms in basins
that have particularly severe water pollution problems to decrease their discharges beyond
the technology-based requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982). If trading of effluent discharge
allocations is ever to be more than a legal curiosity, it is essential to clarify the authority
of state regulatory agencies through national legislation, EPA regulations, or case law.
62. Clean Water Act § 402(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (1982), permits EPA to review
and to veto the issuance of permits by the state. Section 402(d) does not mention tradeable
discharge limits explicitly, but it does enable EPA to object to a permit if issuance would
not conform to the regulations issued under the Act. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 123.61 to 123.63
(1988). However, EPA has not in fact taken any legal action to force Wisconsin to modify
its Fox River regulations.
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of the pollutant problem. 3 In addition, because toxic organic
compounds have been found in paper mill effluents, proposed
trades may lead to high local concentrations of such toxic
pollutants and therefore may not pass administrative review. EPA's
use of BOD as a surrogate for toxic compounds and the absence
of specific effluent standards for these compounds impedes the use
of BOD trading programs." Finally, the Fox River program
suffered from high transaction costs, despite the relatively small
number of firms involved, because there was no brokering or
banking function.
IV. Application to a Proposed Acid Rain Control Program
On a conceptual basis, many resource protection and waste
reduction programs should be able to take advantage of the
economic benefits of credit exchange programs. However, lack of
experience with such programs has been a major obstacle in
designing and implementing them. The experiences described in
this Comment, and the institutional guidelines derived from those
experiences, can help guide the design and implementation of
credit exchange mechanisms to limit pollution and to control the
use of resources efficiently.
Acid rain is a major pollution problem65 that could be reduced
through a program incorporating a credit exchange system.' Acid
rain could be reduced by abating the emissions of sulfur oxides
and nitrogen oxides from sources throughout a large geographical
area. However, the anticipated cost of such a program and the
difficulty of allocating those costs are major obstacles in adopting
63. Wis. ADMiN. CODE § NR 212.115 (May 1986).
64. For example, dioxins have been discovered in the effluents of paper mills that
use chlorine to make white paper products. EPA has not yet developed specific effluent
limits for dioxins in paper mill wastewater and has instead used BOD as a surrogate for
a range of pollutants, including dioxins. See U.S. EPA OffiCE o WATFR, GIumANc FOR SECTION
304(l) LIsTINO AND PERMrrrINO OF PULP ANu PAPER MILLS (memorandum from M. Prothro and
J. Elder to Water Management Division Directors) (Mar. 15, 1989) (on file with authors);
Two E.PA. Studies Confirm Threat to Fish of Dioxin from Paper Plants, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14,
1989. at C4, col. 1.
65. See U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL CRi-rFRIA AND ASSFSSMF.NT OffiCE, AIR QuALrry CRITERIA
FOR PAATICUIATE MATrER AND SULFUR OXIDES (Dec. 1982) (delineating health and welfare effects
associated with exposure to concentrations of the sulfur oxides that cause acid rain); NATIONAL
RsEAtcti COUNCIL, ACID DEosroON: LONG TERM TRNDS (rev. ed. 1986) (scientific studies
documenting causal link between sulfur dioxide emissions and acid rain, and the resulting
environmental damage).
66. For an explanation of a market-based economic incentive program to address
acid rain, see PROJECiT 88, supra note 6. at 50-58.
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an acid rain control program.6 7 Thus, an approach that minimizes
costs for any given level of acid rain reduction would facilitate
congressional adoption of a meaningful program. Economic
analyses strongly suggest that a well-designed emissions trading
program would have significant cost advantages over a program
that requires each major source to reduce its emissions by a
specified amount."
An appropriate design of the credit exchange component of an
acid rain control program is critical. 69 In such a program,
Congress would authorize EPA to issue multiyear permits to
industrial sources of sulfur dioxide, with limits for each source
based on emissions data for the most recent year of the source's
normal operation for which a complete sulfur dioxide inventory
is available. The permits would be revised downwards periodically
according to the emissions reduction schedule. Sources would
receive tradeable credits if they were to reduce their emissions
below their permitted levels. If sources' emissions were to exceed
their permitted levels, they would be required to purchase the
necessary credits and turn them in to EPA.
67. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUlGET OffiCE, CURBiNG ACID RAIN: Cogr, BUtGT AND COAL-
MAiuEr EffECrs xix-xxiv (1986); CENTER FOR CLFAN AIR Poijcv, ACID RAIN: ROAD 1 0 A
MIDDI.F.OROoUND SOLTION 101-03 (July 1987).
68. U.S. CoNrc.SIoNAL BUDGET OfficE. supra note 67; ICF RFSOUscEs, INC., ANALYSiS OF
Six AND Eioirr MILUON TON 30-YFA/NSPS AND 30-Y&I.2 POUND SULFUR DioxiDE EmISSION
REDUCnON CAses ES4 to ES6 (Feb. 1986). See also Major EPA Study Finds S02 'Emissions
Trading' Could Slash Compliance Costs, INSIDE E.P.A., Dec. 2, 1988, at 1, 8 (emissions trading
could result in cost savings of 25% to 50% for acid rain control program in eastern 31-
state region).
69. See PROjECT 88, supra note 6, at 50-58 (explanation of market-based economic
incentive program to address acid rain). The Environmental Defense Fund has proposed
an acid rain control program requiring (1) continuous monitoring of sulfur dioxide emissions
for all sources subject to the program to assure that EPA and states have accurate data by
which to measure compliance with permitted levels of emissions; (2) a 60% reduction in
emissions of sulfur dioxide, from sources emitting more than 0.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide
per million British thermal units (MBTU) of energy produced, over 10 years in the eastern
31-state region; (3) a schedule of reductions in five phases, from no increases to 15%, 30%,
45%, and 60% reductions for each source; (4) an exemption from further reductions for any
source emitting below a threshold emissions rate level such as 0.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide
per MBTU; (5) issuance of emissions credits to any source with emissions below permitted
levels, which may be traded to any other source; (6) additional reductions after 10 years
if the aggregate emissions of sulfur dioxide still exceed 10 million tons in the region; and
(7) compliance by all sources with existing limits on sulfur dioxide emissions incorporated
in air quality standards, state implementation plans, prevention of significant degradation
standards, and new source performance standards. See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, SEcIfi-
CAONS FOR A SULFUR DIOXIDE REDUCIION PROGRAM THAT INCLUDES MARcF.TABLE EMISSIONS REDUCTION
CRuoriS (Draft, Mar. 23, 1989) (on file with authors).
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A credit exchange program designed according to the institu-
tional guidelines should strengthen the effectiveness of the
program in achieving cost savings while attaining air quality goals.
First, Congress should grant EPA explicit legal authority to
implement such a program, and it should specify that EPA's
authority over sulfur dioxide emissions is exclusive within the
region. Second, Congress should provide EPA sufficient funds to
attract a professional staff that is capable of designing and
implementing a technically rigorous program. Third, to ensure
that the program is evasion proof, no source should be eligible
for any exemptions or waivers unless sufficient credits are
purchased. Fourth, EPA must specify clearly' the reductions in
sulfur oxide emissions needed to abate acid rain. In addition, it
must have accurate data from each source concerning its baseline
sulfur oxide emmisions10 Fifth, the problem is clearly amenable
to a regional approach.
Sixth, the program must be as free from administrative burdens
as possible to ensure that the emissions credits have economic
value without compromising real reductions. The mechanism for
certifying that a source qualifies for credits should be effective and
expeditious. Any source which subsequently is shown not to be
entitled to credits should be required, as a minimum penalty, to
purchase the requisite number of credits. Once credits are issued,
the qualifying source should be allowed to transfer them to
another source as a matter of right.
Seventh, all sources emitting sulfur dioxide above a threshold
emissions rate should have to reduce emissions rates by the same
prescribed percentage in each reduction phase. This will ensure
a fair and administratively simple allocation of permitted emissions
levels and assure compliance with the cumulative reduction in
loadings called for in the legislation.
Finally, the legislation should authorize EPA to provide
information to buyers and sellers of credits to facilitate transac-
tions in credits, and to function as a broker in such transactions.
EPA could auction off a small portion of the aggregate permitted
emissions, rather than allocating them, to assure a minimal supply
of credits. These provisions can ensure that an emissions trading
program can be an effective component of an acid rain control
policy.
70. The magnitude of the impact on the environment from high levels of acid
deposition has been documented. See supra note 65.
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Conclusion
Although we have limited experience with credit exchange
mechanisms in pollution abatement programs, we should expand
the use of such mechanisms. In addition to the acid rain control
program described here, other urban air pollution and waste
water effluent abatement programs could benefit from waste
reduction credit exchange programs designed using this Com-
ment's guidelines. With careful attention to technical and concep-
tual details, credit exchange and economic incentive systems can
help deal with an even wider range of regional waste reduction
problems and to achieve resource allocation goals efficiently.

